The Association of Wartime Allies (AWA) serves as the preeminent advocate for Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) eligible individuals since 2019. AWA offers interactive, real-time support and education to 20,300+ SIV principal applicants (representing an estimated 91,350 people when family members are included) to enable them to navigate the complexities of the SIV process with as few delays of their applications as possible. AWA works directly with the US Department of State (DOS), Consular services, National Visa Center, USCIS and numerous US based legal and resettlement organizations to offer a robust network of support to SIV applicants and recipients.

This is the fourth report in the Association of Wartime Allies (AWA) continuing series on the status of SIV eligible individuals left behind after the US withdrawal of Afghanistan. We continue to partner with the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America to survey the military community specifically about their experiences before, during and since August 2021.

The survey data clearly show that our left behind Afghan Allies continue to face years long bureaucratic delays of processing of their SIV applications with lengthy wait times for relocation. A collapsed economy imposes starvation, extreme poverty, and lack of available medical care remain as top concerns for our Afghan Allies. Additionally, a complete shutdown of educational opportunities and a forced shadow existence for all Afghan women and girls create an even more dangerous existence in Afghanistan.

As this report will showcase, since the Taliban takeover, the Taliban have engaged in a systematic country wide effort to hunt down and murder the Afghans who previously worked with American forces. Their campaign has thus far been tragically successful.

Keeping with the valued partnership at the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA) we find that Veterans suffer increasingly from moral injury due to the US’s continued failure to bring the remaining SIVs to safety. That moral injury is further exacerbated by the tragic fate of the SIVs left behind - i.e. veteran moral injury gets worse with every SIV the Taliban successfully hunt down and murder.

While we are thankful that the U.S. government continues to attempt to reduce SIV processing times, the truth of the matter is that the situation for our Afghan Allies has only grown exponentially worse.

The most current data released by Department of State shows a dire situation, with the most current USG data suggesting an SIV relocation pace that is at an alarming and unacceptable rate needing more than 31 years to process.
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THE SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM

Congress created the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program in 2006 to offer protection and a pathway to both lawful permanent residency and United States citizenship to all qualified Iraqis and Afghans employed by the U.S. government in their respective country. The SIV program represents a promise that the U.S. made to its allies to bring them to safety after they provide faithful and valuable service that puts their well-being, their lives, at risk. Following through on that promise is vital to maintaining the perception that the United States can be trusted and is still a leader in the world. Holding true to this promise is a matter of National Security. Without the support of local populations in conflict zones, our troops lack the critical interpretation of language and culture that allows them to surpass barriers and help ensure their safety and the success of their mission. Without the mission critical support of local populations our troops face significantly higher levels of danger.

The most current data released by the Department of State shows a dire situation. The most recent DOS report (Oct. 2022) of the Afghan SIV process states there were 131,049 principal applicants in the SIV pipeline at that time. By reducing the number of pre-COM applicants by 40% (for possible denials) and then applying a 4.5 multiplier for derivatives (based on average from Q4 interviews) we can expect an estimated 360,095 SIV applicants are waiting for SIV processing.

DOS FY22 reports also show an annual total of approximately 11,500 SIV visas issued - a pace that is alarming and unacceptable as it will take more than 31 years at this rate to process the backlog as shown above. To clear this estimated backlog from FY22 Q4 in the next 5 years, we need to increase relocation throughput more than 6 times over on an annual basis.

Backlogs and processing delays, a long-term functional shuttering of the Iraqi SIV program, and the fallout from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan continue to plague the SIV program – leaving most interpreters and translators at grave risk. The U.S. has issued over 26,141 SIV visas to Afghans since the program’s inception through the end of FY2022 (09/30/22).
## AFGHAN POPULATION STATISTICS

As part of our survey we collect specific demographic information about the AWA population. These questions range from the basic information, like age and location, but then also get more specific on family unit dependents. The following is our findings and analysis:

### Age:
The average age of the respondents across all provinces is around 35 years, with the highest average age observed in Laghman Province (54 years) and the lowest in Kapisa Province (28 years).

### Spouse Age:
The average age of the spouse of the respondents is around 24 years, with the highest average age observed in Badakhshan Province (34 years).

### Dependent Count:
The average number of dependents per respondent is around 3, with the highest average dependent count observed in Baghlan Province (6) and the lowest in Jowzjan Province (1.5).

### Child Age:
The average age of the first child is around 9 years, with the highest average age observed in Laghman Province (21 years) and the lowest in Farah Province (1 years). The average age of the second child is around 6 years, with the highest average age observed in Baghlan Province (9.87 years) and the lowest in Ghazni Province (2.20 years). The average age of the third child is around 4 years, with the highest average age observed in Balkh Province (2.39 years) and the lowest in Khost Province (1.14 years). The average age of the fourth, fifth, and sixth child is less than 2 years.

### Regional Differences:
There are noticeable differences in demographic data across the provinces. For instance, the average age of respondents is higher in Laghman Province than any other province, and the average spouse age is also higher in some provinces than others. The average number of dependents is highest in Baghlan Province, and there is a noticeable difference in the age of children across different provinces.

Overall, the demographic data suggests that Afghans have relatively large families with an average of three dependents per respondent. There are noticeable differences in the demographic data across the provinces, and these differences may reflect cultural, economic, and social factors.
The majority of Afghans who served in the US Mission to Afghanistan served for 3.8 years, as evidenced by survey findings. Based on survey findings, we can observe that the majority of respondents (70.42%) were from Kabul Province and had an average length of service to US and coalition forces of 4.7 years. The next highest province was Balkh with 5.79% of respondents and an average length of service of 3.8 years.

It is interesting to note that some provinces with high levels of conflict, such as Helmand and Ghazni, had lower average lengths of service compared to some more stable provinces like Herat and Nangarhar. However, we cannot draw any conclusions about the reasons behind this pattern without additional information. Possible explanations include that Afghans from these provinces have relocated to safer areas (such as Kabul or abroad) or that the combat endured in these areas was often so intense that one’s survival substantially decreased (thus requiring a constant need for more, i.e. new, interpreters).

Additionally, there are some provinces with very low responses, such as Badakhshan and Kapisa, which may not provide a representative sample of the overall population. Therefore, it is important to consider the limitations of the data when interpreting the results. The majority of Afghans who served in the US Mission to Afghanistan served for 4.6 years, as evidenced by the 4.82% of responses from Nangarhar Province and Paktia Province, and the 1.77% of responses from Parwan Province.

The shortest average years of service are from Kapisa Province with only 0.16% of responses and an average of 1.6 years of service. The longest average years of service are from Paktika Province with only 0.16% of responses and an average of 7.8 years of service, followed by Parwan Province with 1.77% of responses and an average of 7.6 years of service.
In carrying out our mission, AWA periodically surveys our network to obtain critical information about processing times, potential barriers, etc. and uses this information to advocate for program improvements. On average it takes an applicant 2.75 years (about 1000 days) to make their way through the SIV Pipeline. This is over a year longer than the 628 processing time in days reported by the US Department of State. That said, the State Department figures do not calculate the ‘applicant controlled’ part of the process which usually includes information gathering by the applicant.

Across the geographic spectrum there are clear disparities in processing in remote and urban areas. The highest average time is in Paktika Province, - home of some of the worst and most remote fighting of the war - with 8.47 years, followed by Baghlan Province with 7.62 years. On the other hand, the provinces with the lowest average time are Laghman, Logar, Kunduz, and Kapisa, all with an average of around 1.5 years.

Kabul Province has the highest number of responses (70.42%) and an average time of 2.50 years in the pipeline. However, the province with the second-highest number of responses, Balkh Province, has a higher average time of 2.79 years.

In summary, the data suggests that there is a significant variation in the average time respondents spend in the Special Immigrant Visa application pipeline across different provinces in Afghanistan, ranging from 1.5 years to over 8 years. The province with the highest number of responses, Kabul, has a relatively lower average time compared to some other provinces. The fear is that the remote areas may not ever be processed...
AWA survey data indicates, the majority of SIV applicants are waiting for an interview (47.86%) or for Chief of Mission (COM) approval (40.21%). Only a small percentage of applicants have received Conditional Approval (0.13%) or have the Printed Visa in possession (0.13%). Approximately 2.28% of applicants are waiting for KBL Number (the processing ID number issued by US Government), while 4.29% are waiting for medical after the interview, and another 2.28% have completed medical examination. Only a small percentage of applicants have Consular Electronic Application Center (CEAC) status shows "ISSUED" (0.54%), while 1.61% of applicants may face COM denial or possible revocation.

Based on the data, we can see the following regional differences in the SIV application process:

- Kabul Province has the highest number of applicants in the SIV process, with 30.97% waiting for an interview and 25.34% waiting for COM approval. This is not surprising as Kabul is the capital city and has a larger population compared to other provinces.
- Balkh Province has a relatively high number of applicants waiting for COM approval, at 1.88%. This could indicate that the processing time for this stage is longer in this province compared to others.
- Herat Province has a relatively high number of applicants waiting for an interview, at 2.68%. This could indicate that the demand for interviews in this province is higher compared to others.
- Khost Province has a relatively high percentage of applicants facing COM denial or possible revocation, at 1.20%.
- Some provinces have very low percentages of applicants in the SIV process, such as Zabul Province with only 0.13%. This could be due to various reasons, including lower demand for SIVs in these provinces or lower awareness of the program.
THE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN VETERANS OF AMERICA COMMUNITY

For this report AWA partnered with the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America to get an understanding of how veterans have been affected by the end of the Afghan War. In particular, we asked veterans how they supported any relocation efforts. The demographic trends and summaries of the data are:

- **Military Branch:** The majority of veterans who supported Afghans relocating after the US military withdrawal were from the Army (68.42%), followed by the Air Force (11.84%), Marine Corps (2.08%), and Navy (1.04%).
- **Active Duty Military Status:** About 71.05% of the respondents were retirees, followed by veterans (26.32%), and active duty military signing as private citizens (2.63%).
- **Highest Grade/Rank:** Most respondents achieved the rank of E-5 (21.05%), followed by E-6 (15.79%), E-4 (10.53%), and E-7 (7.89%). About 13.16% of the respondents achieved the rank of O-3 or higher.
- **Deployment Location:** Most respondents were deployed to Afghanistan (84.21%), followed by Iraq (39.47%), and Kuwait (7.89%). Some respondents were deployed to other locations, including non-disclosed locations.

In summary, the data shows that the majority of veterans who supported Afghans relocating after the US military withdrawal were from the Army, were retirees, achieved the rank of E-5 or E-6, and were deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq.
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
Testimonials collected by the Association of Wartime Allies provide a clear picture of the dire situation that Afghan SIV applicants are facing in their country. There are multiple references to economic difficulties, joblessness, lack of food and basic necessities, and insecurity. Afghan SIV applicants feel that their lives are in danger, either from the Taliban or from other sources of violence.

A common theme throughout the testimonials is the urgent need for relocation. Afghan SIV applicants are seeking help to leave the country and find a safe haven elsewhere. Some have already left Afghanistan, but are still waiting for their cases to be processed or for assistance with resettlement.

The testimonials also highlight the impact of the withdrawal of US troops on the security situation in Afghanistan. Afghan SIV applicants feel that they have been betrayed and abandoned, and that the situation has deteriorated rapidly since the US departure.

Overall, these testimonials paint a bleak picture of life in Afghanistan for many people, particularly those who served alongside U.S. troops/served the U.S. mission. They underscore the need for urgent and coordinated international action to address the humanitarian crisis in the country and to provide assistance to those who are most in need.

There are several trends that can be observed in these testimonials:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Difficulty:</th>
<th>Afghan SIV applicants are struggling with joblessness, poverty, and lack of basic necessities such as food and shelter.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for Relocation:</td>
<td>There is a widespread sense of urgency and desperation among Afghans who are seeking help to leave the country and find safety elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity:</td>
<td>Afghans feel unsafe and fear for their lives due to the ongoing conflict and violence in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of US Troop Withdrawal:</td>
<td>Afghan SIV applicants feel that the situation has worsened since the departure of US troops, and that they have been abandoned by the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to Life:</td>
<td>Afghans are facing various threats to their lives, including from the Taliban, and are calling for assistance to protect themselves and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow Processing of Cases:</td>
<td>There are many references to delays in processing cases for relocation, which is causing additional stress and uncertainty for those affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrayal:</td>
<td>There is a pervasive sense of betrayal and abandonment felt by many Afghans who feel that they have been left to fend for themselves in a very dangerous situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Through periodic surveys of our member network, AWA has consistently sought information about conditions and on-the-ground experiences of those who served the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

The percentage of respondents who had been detained or questioned by the Taliban for their service to the US remained relatively consistent across the four months, ranging from 46% in August to 54% in May. A large majority of respondents (ranging from 88% in February to 93.48% in August) reported losing a job or economic opportunity due to the US withdrawal. The percentage of respondents who reported facing economic hardship due to the US withdrawal remained consistently high across the four months (ranging from 94% in February to 97% in May and August).

The majority of respondents (ranging from 95% in February and August to 97% in May) reported fearing leaving their homes due to retaliation from the Taliban.

In terms of food security, respondents reported having to skip meals due to lack of affordability or availability, with the percentage of respondents who had to skip meals at least once ranging from 16.3% in May to 41.21% in August. In addition, a large majority of respondents (ranging from 76.47% in August to 77% in February and January) reported personally witnessing violence towards individuals who supported the US mission in Afghanistan.

Overall, the data highlights the challenges faced by individuals who have served the US in Afghanistan, including economic hardship, food insecurity, and fears of retaliation from the Taliban. The high percentage of respondents who reported witnessing violence towards individuals who supported the US mission in Afghanistan also suggests a concerning security situation for this population.
Based on testimonials received by AWA, a high level of distress exists among SIV eligible women living in Afghanistan. The majority of the reports express fear for their safety and that of their family members due to the current situation in the country. There is a consistent request for assistance and relocation to the United States or other countries. Many women have reported economic hardship, which is further exacerbated by the high cost of living in the neighboring countries where they have taken refuge. There is also general angst about the restrictions to participating in general society, like the closure of schools to women for instance.

Several reports express concern over the slow processing of their applications, with some applicants waiting for over a year to receive approval. Many women have reported being in hiding and unable to leave their homes due to fear of retribution from the Taliban. Women report feeling trapped, isolated, and unable to leave their homes, with limited access to resources and basic necessities like food, shelter, and healthcare. Many women also express concerns about their safety, particularly those who have worked with NATO or other international organizations, and fear retribution or violence from the Taliban. The data indicates that there is a significant psychological impact on women living in these conditions, with many expressing despair, hopelessness, and desperation.

Overall, the testimonials paint a grim picture of the situation faced by women living in Afghanistan, and urgent action is needed to ensure their safety and wellbeing.
REPORTS OF TARGETED KILLING AND TORTURE
For this survey we added a new question set; we asked if survey respondents knew anyone who was the victim of torture or targeted killing by the Taliban. Targeted Killing, by our definition, is the murder or assassination carried out by defacto officials outside a judicial procedure or a battlefield. Torture is any use of violence by defacto government officials while an individual is in captivity to coerce action or information from that individual.

From our survey, 138 respondents knew someone who was a victim of targeted killing, while 85 respondents knew someone who was a victim of torture.

The data does suggests that there are at least some individuals in the surveyed population who have personal knowledge of cases of torture or targeted killing by the Taliban. This information can be used to inform further investigations, advocacy efforts, and policy-making related to human rights violations in Afghanistan.
The table shows that Pashtuns, who make up 42% of Afghanistan's population, account for the largest share of victims of targeted killing, with 42%. They also make up 50% of the victims of torture. Tajiks, who make up 27% of the Afghan population, account for 30% of the victims of targeted killing and 28% of victims of torture. Hazaras, who make up 9% of the Afghan population, account for 17% of the victims of targeted killing and 18% of victims of torture. Baloch, who make up 2% of the Afghan population, account for 2% of the victims of targeted killing. Other ethnic groups, which make up 20% of the Afghan population, account for 9% of the victims of targeted killing and 5% of victims of torture.

These results suggest that Pashtuns are slightly more affected by targeted killing, as they account for a larger share of the victims than their share of the population. Tajiks are also overrepresented among the victims of targeted killing, while Hazaras are overrepresented among the victims of both targeted killing and torture. However, the disproportion does not suggest that the any specific group is being targeted. The small number of Baloch victims may indicate that they are not a primary target for such violence. The lower proportion of other ethnic groups among the victims may suggest that they are less likely to be targeted, but more data would be needed to draw any firm conclusions.

While ethnicity and religious affiliation have long been a factor for who the Taliban target for persecution and violence, this data indicates the NATO or U.S. affiliation was a more prominent motivating factor.
The common trend in the reports of targeted killings by the Taliban is that the victims were targeted because of their association with the US or their support for the US. The majority of respondents, 69.0%, believe that the person who was a victim of targeted killing by the Taliban worked for the US Government. 12.1% of respondents do not believe that the victim worked for the US Government, while 19.0% of respondents indicated that they do not know whether or not the victim worked for the US Government.

Most of the victims worked with the US military as interpreters or contractors. In some cases, the Taliban captured and tortured the victims before killing them, while in others, they were simply shot dead. Some of the victims were warned before their deaths, but either they did not take the warnings seriously or they were unable to evade capture. In many cases, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the killings. Some victims were killed in their homes, and others were kidnapped and later found dead. These targeted killings have caused fear among people who have worked with the US military or supported them, and some people are hiding for their own safety.

8 females and 130 males were victims of targeted killing based on results of our survey.

Some specific callouts of the victims:
- One female victim was 35 years old, but no information is provided about the circumstances of her targeted killing.
- Another female victim, aged 29, was killed because she was the sister of someone who worked with American forces.
- A 63-year-old female victim died in a bomb blast while shopping for her family before Eid, which was perpetrated by a group that had warned her and her family.
- Another female victim, aged 38, survived being tortured by the Taliban and is believed to be dead.
- One male victim, aged 26, was an employee of a company that worked with the US embassy and was shot by unknown armed individuals.
- Another male victim, aged 36, was captured and killed by the Taliban, and his body was found two days later.
- A 28-year-old male victim was accused of collaborating with the Americans, and the Taliban killed him on his wedding night.
- Another male victim, aged 40, was kidnapped, and his dead body was found a week later. He had previously worked with the US Army as an interpreter.
- A 32-year-old male victim was captured and killed by the Taliban.
- A 48-year-old male victim was wrongly accused of collaborating with infidels, and he was later declared innocent when it was revealed that the person he was accused of killing was a shepherd. Another male victim, aged 40, was killed in his area because he worked for the US government. Another interpreter, aged 38, was killed along with his two children.
- A 45-year-old male victim was captured and killed in Kabul, while another male victim, aged 32, was killed while he was sleeping at his home.
- A 33-year-old male victim was killed in front of his home.
- A 32-year-old male victim was killed by the Taliban in Jalalabad province, and he had worked for the American army.
- Another male victim, aged 35, was killed because he was an interpreter with the US Army.

69.0%, BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON WHO WAS A VICTIM OF TARGETED KILLING BY THE TALIBAN WORKED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT.
The majority of victims of targeted killing belonged to Sunni Islam (78.5%).

A significant minority of victims belonged to Shia Islam (16.5%).

The religious makeup of Afghanistan shows a similar pattern, with Sunni Islam being the majority (75.4%) and Shia Islam being the minority (16.1%).

A notable proportion of the victims' religious affiliation is unknown (5.1%), which could indicate a lack of information or difficulty in identifying the victims' religious beliefs.

Kabul Province had the highest count of targeted killings with 38, and an average age of 34.35. Kandahar Province had 7 targeted killings with an average age of 45.5. Panjshir Province and Balkh Province had 7 and 6 targeted killings respectively, with average ages of 40.75 and 35.25.

Other provinces with multiple targeted killings include Khost Province, Nangarhar Province, Paktia Province, Herat Province, Logar Province, and Wardak Province, with average ages ranging from 26 to 38.
The trend in the torture done by the Taliban appears to be primarily targeted towards those who have worked or associated with the United States government, military or funded projects. These individuals are accused of being "kafir" (infidels) and are tortured and punished for their supposed collaboration with the enemy. The Taliban also appear to punish individuals who are accused of negative advertising against their regime or supporting resistance groups, and those who are perceived to be involved in activities that violate their strict interpretation of Islamic law, such as singing and dancing. In many cases, the Taliban also target the family members of the individuals they are searching for, and use torture and violence to extract information about other potential targets or collaborators – i.e. “collective punishment.”

It is important to note that all the accounts describe incidents of torture, and most of them are related to the individual’s affiliation with the US government or their projects. In some cases, the person was accused of working for the US, while in others, they were accused of having negative opinions about the Taliban or supporting resistance groups.

In some cases, the extended family of the SIV applicants were also targeted due to the SIVs affiliation with the U.S., some being tortured, some being killed. The torture involved physical beatings and being held in custody for days or weeks. Individuals are often subject to electric shock torture as well. Some individuals were never seen or heard from again.

Overall, these incidents highlight the dangers faced by individuals who worked with the US government or were perceived to be opposed to the Taliban’s rule. It also underscores the need for protection and assistance for these individuals, especially during times of conflict or political transitions.
Based on the given data, it appears that most of the alleged tortures conducted by the Taliban were in Kabul Province, with a count of 43. Nangarhar Province, Balkh Province, Kandahar Province, Paktia Province, and Khost Province each had between 3-5 alleged cases of torture. The remaining provinces each had one or two cases reported.

Based on the survey conducted, it appears that the majority of victims of torture in Afghanistan are Sunni Muslims, with 78.5% of the victims identifying as such. This aligns with the fact that Sunni Islam is the dominant religion in Afghanistan, with 90% of the population identifying as Sunni Muslims. Shia Muslims make up 16.5% of the victims of torture, despite only accounting for 9.7% of the population. This may suggest that members of this minority group are disproportionately targeted for torture.

The category of "Unknown" makes up 5.1% of the victims of torture, while only representing 0.3% of the population. It is unclear what this category represents, but it may include individuals who do not identify with either Sunni or Shia Islam, or whose religious affiliation is unknown. Only males were the victim of torture.

Based on the survey conducted, it appears that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group among the victims of torture in Afghanistan, accounting for 50% of the victims, while making up 42% of the population according to the 2010 estimate from World Factbook/Library of Congress Country Studies. Tajiks, on the other hand, account for 28% of the victims of torture while making up 27% of the population. Hazaras account for 18% of the victims of torture while making up 9% of the population, suggesting that members of this minority group are disproportionately targeted for torture.

Other ethnic groups, including Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Baloch, account for smaller proportions of the victims of torture, with each group representing between 2% and 9% of the total.

The "Others" category, which includes various ethnic groups such as Pashai, Nuristani, Kurds, Arab, Brahui, Pamiri, Gujjar, Qizilbash, and others, make up 4% of the victims of torture, which is the same proportion as their representation in the overall population.

Overall, this data highlights the potential targeting of minority ethnic groups for torture in Afghanistan, particularly Hazaras, while Pashtuns make up the largest proportion of the victims of torture, which may be due to their larger population size.
MILITARY COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE
There are several different sentiments expressed in these testimonials, but some common themes emerge. One theme is frustration with the handling of the Afghanistan withdrawal and the resulting chaos. Many of the veterans express disappointment with the government and military leadership, feeling that they failed to adequately plan for the withdrawal or to protect Afghan interpreters and other allies who worked with US forces. There is also a sense of responsibility and associated guilt felt by some of the veterans, who believe that they have a duty to help those they worked with in Afghanistan - i.e. moral injury. Veterans continue to suffer from this moral injury due to the inability to help Afghans escape the hellacious lives they currently endure under Taliban occupation and control (as described above).

Overall, the tone of the testimonials is mixed, with some expressing optimism and a desire to help, while others express frustration and disillusionment. There is a sense of urgency in many of the comments, reflecting the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and the need for action to help those who are in danger.

According to the data provided, 48.69% of veterans are suffering from some form of trauma (physical, mental, structural, or emotional) as a result of the events of the US Withdrawal of Afghanistan. 32.98% responded with "No" and 18.32% preferred not to say.
On a positive note, those veterans who have assisted with successfully relocating and resettling Afghans report encouraging results. 77.2% report that the Afghan they are supporting is gainfully employed and that 72% are in permanent housing - a trend that supports our suspicion that the most effective way for veterans to mitigate / heal from their moral injury is by helping the Afghans who remain in need of relocation and resettlement.

One trend that can be observed from the data is the diversity of organizations that are involved in relocating Afghans under Taliban rule. Many different organizations are working together in addition to AWA and IAVA ranging from veterans organizations like the VFW, DAV and American Legion to non-profits like Veterans for American Ideals, to military groups like NATO Training Mission NTM and ANSF. Some other organizations mentioned in the data are HeadStrong, Save Our Allies, Mission 22 and Project Exodus Relief.
Nutrition

77.3% of Afghans have had to skip meals in the last month due to the inability to afford food. Of those respondents, the majority reported having to skip meals between one and five times in the last month (37.8%). However, a significant portion also reported having to skip meals six to ten times (21.7%) or more than ten times (17.0%).

Overall, the data highlights the severity of food insecurity in Afghanistan, with a significant portion of the population struggling to afford basic necessities like food. This is likely due to a combination of factors, including economic instability and the recent political turmoil in the country. The data suggests that urgent action is needed to address food insecurity in Afghanistan and ensure that all Afghans have access to affordable and nutritious food.

Meat and rice are the most commonly mentioned foods that are now unavailable, followed by fresh fruits and vegetables, cooking oil, and flour. Some respondents mention that they are unable to get any kind of food due to their bad economic situation, loss of jobs, or lack of support from aid organizations. The data also suggests that some areas are more affected than others. Bagrami and Behsud are the districts with the highest number of respondents reporting food shortages.
Food Prices

Regarding the prices of basic staples, we can see that the prices for a kilogram of rice have generally increased in most of the districts in Afghanistan. The largest increase in price appears to be in the Kabul district, where the average price of rice has increased from approximately 89 Afghani to 154 Afghani per kilo. This represents an increase of around 70%.

Other districts that have seen significant price increases include Bagrami, where the average price has increased from approximately 83 Afghani to 135 Afghani per kilo, and Hirat, where the average price has increased from approximately 45 Afghani to 86 Afghani per kilo.

There are also some districts where the price of rice has remained relatively stable or even decreased slightly, such as Ghoryan, where the average price has decreased from approximately 74 Afghani to 36 Afghani per kilo. However, these districts are in the minority.

Overall, the data suggests that the cost of rice has increased significantly in Afghanistan since the US withdrawal. This is likely due to a combination of factors, including economic instability and supply chain disruptions caused by the US Withdrawal. The impact of this price increase on the population of Afghanistan, especially the poor and vulnerable, could be severe.
Medical Treatment

The data suggests that access to basic medical equipment and procedures in Afghanistan under Taliban rule is limited.

Regarding access to mild pain medication, the majority of respondents (66.56%) reported having access, but a significant minority (17.99%) reported not having access. It is unclear why 15.75% of respondents answered "not applicable" to this question.

However, a much higher percentage of respondents (81.83%) reported having to skip necessary medical treatment in the past month, indicating that access to necessary medical care is a significant issue.

Regarding access to diabetes medication, only 54.53% of respondents reported having access, while 32.29% reported not having access. It is unclear why 13.18% of respondents answered "not applicable" to this question.

Access to basic first aid equipment is also limited, with only 36.02% of respondents reporting having access, while 43.93% reported not having access. Again, it is unclear why 18.05% of respondents answered "not applicable" to this question.

Overall, the data suggests that access to basic medical equipment and procedures is a significant issue in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, with many respondents reporting limited or no access to necessary medical care and medication.
Policy Recommendation

Congress must Pass the Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA)

The AAA is comprehensive legislation designed to fix many legal problems facing relocated Afghans as well as it provides assistance to those fleeing the Taliban. Some points on why the AAA should be passed:

- **Providing protection to vulnerable Afghans:**
  - The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan has raised concerns about the safety and well-being of Afghans who assisted the US and its allies during the war. The Afghan Adjustment Act would provide a pathway to legal permanent residency for Afghan nationals who worked alongside US troops or government agencies, putting them at risk of retribution.

- **Upholding American values:**
  - Supporting the Afghan Adjustment Act would demonstrate America's commitment to standing with those who have helped them in times of need. It would also demonstrate America’s commitment to human rights and its willingness to provide refuge to those in need.

- **Addressing humanitarian crisis:**
  - With the Taliban’s takeover, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, including a severe shortage of food and other basic necessities. Allowing Afghan nationals to come to the US would not only provide them with safety but also relieve the burden on neighboring countries that have been overwhelmed by the influx of refugees.

- **Fulfilling moral obligation:**
  - Many believe that the US has a moral obligation to provide protection and support to those who risked their lives to help US troops and agencies during the war. Failing to do so would not only put these individuals at risk but also undermine America's reputation and credibility in the international community.
Policy Recommendation

Congress must pass the portion of President Biden's 2024 Budget addressing Afghans

President Biden has proposed the admittance of 125,000 Refugees next year in his FY2024 budget. We applaud this strong effort, but it is up to the Congress to pass this. Congress must act to pass the president's budget for the following reasons; First and foremost, the United States has a long and proud history of welcoming refugees from around the world. In fact, the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program was established in 1980 with bipartisan support, and since then, millions of refugees have been resettled in the U.S. They have become valuable members of our society, contributing to our economy, enriching our culture, and strengthening our communities.

Moreover, it is important to note that the admission of refugees is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic imperative. Refugees are often victims of war, persecution, or other forms of violence, and they flee their homes in search of safety and protection. By admitting refugees, the United States is fulfilling its humanitarian obligation to protect vulnerable people and promote human rights. Additionally, admitting refugees can also contribute to U.S. national security by building stronger relationships with countries of origin and enhancing global stability.

Furthermore, the admission of 125,000 additional refugees would be consistent with U.S. values and international norms. The United States has long been a leader in refugee resettlement, and other countries look to us for guidance and inspiration. By increasing the number of refugees admitted, the United States can set an example for other countries to follow and encourage them to do their part in addressing the global refugee crisis.

In terms of the budgetary impact, it is important to note that the cost of admitting refugees is relatively small compared to the benefits they bring. According to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research, refugees have a positive impact on the U.S. economy, contributing to job creation, increased economic output, and increased tax revenue. Moreover, refugees who are resettled in the U.S. are required to repay their travel costs to the U.S. government, making the program self-sustaining.

In conclusion, admitting 125,000 additional refugees into the United States is not only the right thing to do, but also the smart thing to do. By fulfilling our moral obligation, promoting our national security, setting an example for other countries, and reaping the economic benefits, we can strengthen our country and our world.
Policy Recommendation

Work with international community to pressure the Taliban to stop killing and expedite & facilitate relocation of wartime allies

Work with the international community to pressure the Taliban to stop killing and expedite & facilitate relocation of wartime allies to a safe location outside of Afghanistan. This would require the Taliban's cooperation, but there are several reasons why it is in their interest to agree to such a deal.

First, the Taliban has stated that they want to establish good relations with the international community. Allowing the relocation of these individuals would demonstrate their willingness to work with other nations and could help to rebuild their reputation in the eyes of the world.

Second, the Taliban has also expressed a desire to maintain stability and security within Afghanistan. By allowing these individuals to leave the country, they would remove a potential source of conflict and instability that could lead to further violence and unrest. In addition to these benefits, negotiating a deal to relocate these individuals would also be a moral imperative. The United States and other countries made a commitment to protect these individuals and their families, and we have a responsibility to follow through on that commitment.

Of course, negotiating with the Taliban is not without risks, and we must approach any such deal with caution. However, given the potential benefits, and the urgency of the situation, we believe that it is worth pursuing.
Policy Recommendation

Create long term lily pads in intermediary countries to process Afghans coming to the United States

One way to provide this safe haven is through the establishment of intermediary staging areas, or "lily-pads," in third countries such as Middle Eastern countries or Guam. These lily-pads would serve as temporary holding facilities for Afghans who have been approved for resettlement in the United States. They would provide a safe and secure environment for individuals and families to wait until their travel to the U.S. can be arranged.

There are several compelling reasons to establish these lily-pads. Firstly, it is simply not safe for Afghans who have assisted the U.S. government or military to remain in Afghanistan. The Taliban has a history of targeting individuals who have worked with the U.S. or its allies, and there are already reports of reprisals against Afghans who have assisted the U.S. during the recent conflict. Providing a safe place for these individuals to wait for resettlement to the U.S. is the humane thing to do.

Secondly, establishing these lily-pads would help streamline the resettlement process. It can be a lengthy and complicated process to obtain the necessary visas and travel documents to enter the United States, particularly in a situation as chaotic as the current one in Afghanistan. By having these intermediary staging areas, the U.S. government can ensure that individuals and families are properly vetted and have the necessary documentation before they arrive in the United States.

Thirdly, establishing lily-pads in third countries would help alleviate some of the logistical challenges of resettling large numbers of people in the United States. Providing temporary housing and support in these third countries would allow for a more orderly process of transitioning individuals and families to the United States. It would also help mitigate some of the potential strain on resources and infrastructure in the U.S.

Finally, establishing these lily-pads would send a powerful message to the world about America’s commitment to its values of democracy, freedom, and human rights. By providing a safe haven for those who have risked their lives to assist the U.S. in its efforts, the U.S. would demonstrate its unwavering commitment to the protection of those who share its values.

In conclusion, establishing intermediary staging areas or lily-pads in third countries for Afghans seeking resettlement in the United States is a necessary and compassionate response to the current crisis in Afghanistan. It would provide a safe and secure environment for individuals and families who are in danger, streamline the resettlement process, alleviate logistical challenges, and demonstrate America’s commitment to its values.
REPORT METHODOLOGY

AWA partnered with Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America to survey their members in a continuation of a partnership that we shared in our last report. Thus this report is built upon feedback from surveys of both of our organizations' membership to help illustrate the sentiment of both populations as it relates to the ongoing effort to relocate our wartime allies from Afghanistan.

AWA members were engaged directly through the network we’ve established and vetted on an ongoing basis since 2019, and IAVA sent direct emails to its veteran members who participated in our last survey to solicit additional feedback for this new report.

New to this report is analysis that was assisted by artificial intelligence (AI) to help us identify trends in the qualitative data that was gathered from both veterans and Afghans. Rigorous cross-checking of randomized samples was executed to aid in accuracy, and this approach had the added benefit of allowing the report’s authors to get some emotional distance from the testimonials that could have inadvertently impacted the findings.